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prosodic constituent of type CP in the surface pho-
nology. There have been other, relation-based, pro-
posals concerning the nature of syntax–prosodic
structure interface constraints as well, including
Nespor and Vogel 1986, McHugh 1990, Kim 1997, all
understood to be consistent with the prosodic
structure hypothesis, and with the input–output
architecture.
An input–output model of the syntax–phonology
interface makes the essential claim that constraints on
phonological output representation do not interact
with constraints on the surface syntactic represen-
tation. Two sorts of apparent challenges for the
input–output model have recurred in recent literature.
One sort concerns clitics whose distribution is
governed by both syntactic and prosodic constraints,
such as the second position clitics of Serbo-Croatian
(Inkelas and Zec 1990). Yet because the syntax itself
aﬀords options in the positioning of second position
clitics, it is not necessary to construe the prosodic
subcategorizationofacliticasoutrankingaconstraint
on syntactic word order. Another sort of challenge
concerns the alleged dependence of word order on the
positioning of focus-related prosodic prominences in
the sentence, as suggested by Vallduvi (1991) for
Catalan, or Zubizarreta (1998) for Spanish. However,
since the latter sort of phenomenon potentially can
receiveapurelysyntactictreatmentinwhichtheFocus
properties of syntactic representation are crucial in
determining word order (see, e.g., Grimshaw and
Samek-Lodovici 1998), this sort of case is not yet
compelling. It remains to be seen whether the syntax–
phonology interface is an input–output relation or
whether it is instead a two-way street.
See also Generative Grammar; Phonology; Syntax
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Syntax–Semantics Interface
Anybody who speaks English knows that (1) is a
sentence of English, and also has quite a precise idea
about what (1) means.
(1) Every boy is holding a block.
Englishspeakers knowforinﬁnitelymanysentences
that they are sentences of English, and they also know
the meaning of these inﬁnitely many sentences. A
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Syntax–Phonology Interfacecentral idea of generative syntax (see Linguistics:
Incorporation) is that the structure of a sentence is
given by a recursive procedure, as this provides the
means to derive our knowledge about the inﬁnite
number of sentences with ﬁnite means. For the same
reason, semanticists have developed recursive pro-
cedures that assign a meaning to sentences based on
the meaning of their parts.
The syntax–semantics interface establishes a re-
lationshipbetween these two recursive procedures. An
interface between syntax and semantics becomes
necessary only if they indeed constitute two autono-
mous systems. This is widely assumed to be the
case, though not entirely uncontroversial as some
approaches (see Grammar: Functional Approaches and
Montague Grammar) do not subscribe to this
hypothesis.
Consider two arguments in favor of the assumption
that syntax is autonomous: one is that there are
apparently purely formal requirements for the well-
formedness of sentences. For example, lack of agree-
ment as in (2) renders (1) ill-formed (customarily
marked by preﬁxing the sentence with an asterisk),
thoughsubject–verbagreementdoesnotseemtomake
any contribution to the meaning of (1).
(2) *Every boy hold a block.
The special role of uninterpretable features for
syntax comes out most sharply in recent work by
Chomsky (1995), who regards it as one of the main
purposes of syntax to eliminate such uninterpretable
features before a sentence is interpreted.
On the other hand, there are also sentences that are
syntactically well-formed, but do not make any sense
(often marked by preﬁxing the sentence with a hatch
mark). Chomsky’s (1957, p. 15) famous example in (a)
makes this point, and so does (b).
(3) (a) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
(b) She arrived for an hour.
Independent of the value of these arguments, the
separation of syntax and semantics has led to tremen-
dous progress in the ﬁeld. So, at least it has been a
successful methodological principle.
1. Basic Assumptions
Work on the syntax–semantics interface by necessity
proceeds from certain assumptions about syntax and
semantics. We are trying to keep to a few basic
assumptions here. In the specialized articles on gener-
ative syntax (Linguistics: Incorporation), and quan-
tiﬁers (Quantiﬁers, in Linguistics) many of these
assumptions are discussed and justiﬁed in more
depth.
For the syntax, we assume that sentences have a
hierarchical constituent structure that groups words
and subconstituents into constituents. Also, we as-
sume that constituents can be moved from one part of
the tree structure to another, subject to constraints of
the kind Ross (1967) ﬁrst described. The constituent
structure of a sentence is captured by the kind of
phrase structure tree illustrated in (4)(a). (4)(b) shows
a phrase structure tree with a movement relation.
S
NP VP
NP d tee gre boy n O
th e te ær
(4(a))
(4(b)) S
Wh o S
did S
John V P
gre t e t
The task of semantics is to capture the meaning of a
sentence. Consider ﬁrst the term ‘meaning.’ In col-
loquial use, ‘meaning’ includes vague associations
speakersmayhavewithasentencethatdonotexistfor
all speakers of a language: e.g., the sentence ‘I have a
dream’ may have a special meaning in this colloquial
sense to people familiar with Martin Luther King.
Semantics, however, is at present concerned only
with reproducible aspects of sentence meaning. In
particular, semanticists have focused on the question
ofwhetherasentenceisjudgedtrueorfalseinacertain
situation. Part of what any speaker of English knows
about the meaning of (1) is that it is true in the
situation shown in picture A, but false in the situation
shown in picture B.
(5) Every boy is holding a block.
Picture A Picture B
All speakers of English are equipped with certain
mental mechanisms that enable them to make this
truth value judgment for (1) and similar judgments for
inﬁnitely many other sentences. An explicit theory can
be given using techniques similar to those used in
mathematicallogic.Inthisapproach,themeaningofa
constituent is modeled by a mathematical object (an
individual, a function, a set, or a more complicated
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Syntax–Semantics Interfaceobject). Complete declarative sentences such as (1)
correspond to functions that assign to possible situ-
ations one of the truth values True or False. The basic
intuition of entailment between sentences as in (6) is
captured if for every situation to which the meanings
of the premises (a) and (b) assign True, the meaning of
the conclusion (c) also assigns to this situation True.
(6) (a) Every boy is holding a block.
(b) John is a boy.
(c) Therefore, John is holding a block.
2. Syntax–Semantics Correspondences
Though syntax and semantics are two autonomous
recursive procedures, most researchers assume that
there is a relationship between the two to be captured
by the theory of the syntax–semantics interface. In
particular, it seems to be the case that the steps of the
recursion are largely the same. In other words, two
phrases that form a syntactic constituent usually form
a semantic constituent as well (Partee (1975) and
others).
Consider (7) as an illustration of this.
(7) (a) A smart girl  bought  a thin book.
(b) A thin girl  bought  a smart book.
Subject  Verb  Object
Syntacticians have argued that the subject and the
object in (6) form constituents, which we call noun
phrases (abbreviated as NPs). We see in (6) that the
adjective that occurs in a NP also makes a semantic
contribution to that NP. This is not just the case in
English: as far as we know, there is no language where
adjectivesoccurringwiththesubjectmodifytheobject,
and vice versa.
Further evidence for the close relation of syntactic
and semantic constituency comes from so many
phenomena that we cannot discuss them all. Brieﬂy
considerthecaseofidioms.Ontheonehand,anidiom
is a semantically opaque unit whose meaning does not
derive from the interpretation of its parts in a
transparent way. On the other hand, an idiom is
syntactically complex. Consider (8).
(8) (a) Paul kicked the bucket. (‘Paul died.’)
(b) The shit hit the fan. (‘Things went wrong.’)
The examples in (8) show a verb–object idiom and a
subject–verb–objectidiom.Whataboutasubject–verb
idiom that is then combined transparently with the
object? Marantz (1984, pp. 24–28) claims that there
are no examples of this type in English. Since syn-
tacticians have argued that the verb and the object
form a constituent, the verb phrase, that does not
include the subject (the VP in (4)), Marantz’s gen-
eralization corroborates the claim that idioms are
always syntactic constituents, which follows from the
close relationship between syntax and semantics.
If syntactic and semantic recursion are as closely
related as we claim, an important question is the
semantic equivalent of syntactic constituent forma-
tion. In other words, what processes can derive the
interpretation of a syntactically complex phrase from
the interpretation of its parts? Speciﬁcally, the most
elementary case is that of a constituent that has two
parts. This is the question to which the next two
sections provide an answer.
2.1 Constituency
2.1.1 Predication as functional application. An old
intuition about sentences is that the verb has a
special relationship with the subject and the objects.
Amongthetermsthathavebeenusedforthisphenom-
enon are ‘predication’, which we adopt, ‘theta mark-
ing,’ and ‘assigns a thematic role.’
(9) John gave Mary Brothers Karamazo.
One basic property of predication is a one-to-one
relation of potential argument positions of a predicate
and actually ﬁlled argument positions. For example,
the subject position of a predicate can only contain
one nominal: (a) shows that two nominals are two
many; and (b) shows that none is not enough.
(10) (a) *John Bill gave Mary Brothers Karamazo.
(b) *gave Mary Brothers Karamazo.
Chomsky (1981) describes this one-to-one require-
ment between predication position and noun phrases
ﬁlling this position as the theta-criterion.
The relationship between ‘gave’ and the three NPs
in (9) is also a basic semantic question. The observed
one-to-one correspondence has motivated an analysis
of verbs as mathematical functions. A mathematical
function maps an argument to a result. Crucially, a
function must take exactly one argument to yield a
result, and therefore the one-to-one property of
predication is explained. So, far example, the meaning
of ‘gave Mary Brothers K.’ in (10) would be captured
asa functionthattakesone argumentand yieldseither
True or False as a result, depending on whether the
sentence is true or false.
Thephrase‘gaveMaryBrothersK.’(theverbphrase)
in (9) is itself semantically complex, and involves two
further predication relations. The meaning of the verb
phrase, however, is a function. Therefore the semantic
analysis of the verb phrase requires us to adopt higher
order functions of the kind explored in mathemat-
ical work by Scho  nﬁnkel (1924) and Curry (1930).
Namely, we make use of functions the result of which
is itself a function. Then, a transitive verb like ‘greet’ is
modeled as a function that, after applying to one
argument (the object), yields as its result a function
thatcanbecombinedwiththesubject.Theditransitive
verb ‘give’ is captured as a function that yields a
function of the same type as ‘greet’ after combining
with one argument.
Functional application is one way to interpret a
branching constituent. It applies more generally than
just in NP–verb combinations. Another case of predi-
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copula, as in (11). We assume here that the copula is
actually semantically empty (i.e., a purely formal
element), and the adjective is a function from indi-
vidualstotruthvalues,mappingexactlythered-haired
individuals on to True (see Rothstein 1983).
(11) Tina is red-haired.
Similarly,(12)canbeseenasacaseofpredicationof
‘girl’ on the noun ‘Tina.’ For simplicity, we assume
that in fact not only the copula but also the indeﬁnite
articles in (12) are required only for formal reasons.
Then,‘girl’canbeinterpretedasthefunction mapping
an individual who is a girl on to True, and all other
individuals on to False.
(12) Tina is a girl.
2.1.2 Predicate modiﬁcation as intersection. Con-
sider now example (13). In keeping with what we said
about the interpretation of (11) and (12) above, (13)
should be understood as a predication with the predi-
cate ‘red-haired girl.’
(13) Tina is a red-haired girl.
The predicate ‘red-haired girl’ would be true of all
individuals who are girls and are red-haired. But
clearly,thismeaningisderivedsystematicallyfromthe
meanings of ‘red-haired’ and ‘girl.’ This is generally
viewed as a second way to interpret a branching
constituent: by intersecting two predicates, and es-
sentially goes back to Quine (1960).
2.1.3 Predicate abstraction. A third basic interpret-
ation rule can be motivated by considering relative
clauses. The meaning of (14a) is very similar to that
of (13). For this reason, relative clauses are usually
considered to be interpreted as predicates (Quine
1960, p. 110 f.).
(14) (a) Tina is a girl who has red hair.
(b) Tina is a girl who Tom likes.
Syntacticians have argued that the relative pro-
nouns in (14) are related in some way to an argument
position of the verb. We adopt the assumption that
this relationship is established by syntactic movement
of the relative pronoun to an initial position of the
relative clause.
(15) whox x has red hair
whox Tom likes x
Looking at the representation in (15), the semantic
contribution of the relative pronoun is to make a
predicate out of a complete clause which denotes a
truth value. An appropriate mathematical model for
this process is lambda-abstraction (Church 1941). The
deﬁnition in (16) captures the intuition that (14b)
entails the sentence ‘Tom likes Tina,’ where the
argumentofthepredicateisinsertedintheappropriate
position in the relative clause (see, e.g., Cresswell
(1973) or Partee et al. (1990) for more precise treat-
ments of lambda abstraction).
(16) [λx XP] is interpreted as the function that maps
an individual with name A to a result r where r
is the interpretation of XP after replacing all
occurrences of x with A.
Functional application, predicate modiﬁcation and
lambda abstraction are probably the minimal inven-
tory that is needed for the interpretation of all
hypothesized syntactic structures.
2.2 Scope
2.2.1 Quantiﬁer scope. A second area where a num-
ber of correspondences between syntax and seman-
tics have been found are semantic interactions
between quantiﬁcational expressions. Consider the
examples in (17) (adapted from Rodman (1976,
p. 168):
(17) (a) There’s a ball that every boy is playing with.
(b) Every boy is playing with a ball.
The diﬀerence between (17a) and (17b) is that only
(17b) is true when every boy is playing with a diﬀerent
ball, as in picture B; (17a) is only judged to be true in
the situation depicted in picture A, where every boy is
playing with the same ball.
Picture A Picture B
(18)
The semantic diﬀerence between (17a) and (17b)
correlates with a diﬀerence in syntactic structure.
Namely,in(17b)‘aball’ispartofthesisterconstituent
of ‘every boy,’ while it is not so in (17a).
The special role the sister constituent plays for
semantic interpretation was ﬁrst made explicit by
Reinhart (1976) building on the work of Klima (1964)
and others. She introduced the term c-command for
the relationship where a phrase enters with any other
phrase inside its sister constituent, and proposed that
the domain of c-commanded phrases (i.e., the sister
constituent) is the domain of semantic rule appli-
cation. The c-command domain is then equated with
what logicians call the scope.
Ontherecursiveinterpretationproceduredeveloped
in the previous section, Reinhart’s generalization is
captured in a straightforward manner. This can be
seen without being precise about the semantics of
quantiﬁers (see Sect. 3.1, and Quantiﬁers, in Linguis-
tics). Consider the interpretation of the relative
clause constituent in (a), which is shown with the
lambda operator forming a predicate in (19). This
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Syntax–Semantics Interfacepredicate will only be true of an object a if every boy is
playing with a. Such an individual is found in picture
B, but not in picture A.
(19) Every boy is playing with x.
For sentence (17b), however, we want to interpret
the verb phrase ‘is playing with a ball’ as a predicate
that is true of an individual a, if there is some ball that
a is playing with. (Below, in Sect. 3.2, we sketch a way
to derive this meaning of VP from the meanings of its
parts.)Crucially,thispredicateisfulﬁlledbyeveryboy
in both picture A and picture B.
2.2.2 Binding. A second case where c-command is
important is the binding of pronouns by a quantiﬁ-
cational antecedent. Consider the examples in (20).
(20) (a) Every girl is riding her bike.
(b) Every girl is riding John’s bike.
Sentence(a)isjudgedtrueinasituationwherethegirls
are riding diﬀerent bicycles—speciﬁcally, their own
bicycles. Example (b), however, is only true if John’s
bike is carrying all the girls. The relationship between
the subject ‘every girl’ and the pronoun ‘her’ in (a) can
only be made more precise by using the concept of
variable binding that has its origin in mathematical
logic. (Note that, for example, the relevant interpret-
ation of (a) is not expressible by replacing the
pronominal with its antecedent ‘every girl,’ since this
would result in a diﬀerent meaning.)
Weassume thattheinterpretationoftheVPin(20a)
can be captured as in (21) following Partee (1975) and
others.
(21) λx is riding x’s bike.
The relevance of c-command can be seen by com-
paring (20a) with (22). Though (22) contains the NP
‘every girl’ and the pronoun ‘her,’ (22) cannot be true
unless all the boys are riding together on a single bike.
The interpretation that might be expected in (22) in
analogy to (20a) but which is missing can be para-
phrased as ‘For every girl, the boys that talked with
her are riding her bike.’
(22) The boys who talked with every girl are
riding her bike.
The relevance of c-command corroborates the
recursive interpretation mechanism that ties syntax
and semantics together. Because binding involves the
interpretation mechanism (16) operating on the sister
constituent of the λ-operator, only expressions c-
commanded by a λ-operator can be bound by it. In
other words, an antecedent can bind a pronoun only if
the pronoun is in the scope of its λ-operator.
3. Syntax–Semantics Mismatches
3.1 Subject Quantiﬁers
Whenwe consider thesemantics ofquantiﬁers inmore
detail, it turns out that the view that predication in
syntax and functional application in semantics have
a one-to-one correspondence, as expressed above, is
too simple. Consider example (23) which is repeated
from (1).
(23) Every boy is holding a block.
Assume that the verb phrase ‘is holding a block’ is a
one-place predicate that is true of any individual who
is holding a block. Our expectation is then that the
interpretation of (23) is achieved by applying this
predicate to an individual who represents the in-
terpretation of the subject ‘every boy.’ But some
reﬂection shows that this is impossible to accom-
plish—the only worthwhile suggestion to capture the
contribution of ‘every boy’ to sentence meaning by
means of one individual, is that ‘every boy’ is inter-
preted as the group of all boys. But the examples
in (24) show that ‘every boy’ cannot be interpreted in
this way.
(24) (a) Every boy (*together) weighs 50 kilos.
(b) All the boys (together) weigh 50 kilos.
The interpretation of (24) cannot be achieved by
applying the predicate that represents the VP meaning
to any individual. It can also be seen that predicate
modiﬁcation cannot be used to assign the right
interpretation to examples like (24a). The solution
that essentially goes back to Frege (1879) and was
made explicit by Ajdukiewicz (1935) is that actually
the quantiﬁcational subject is a higher order function
that takes the VP predicate as its argument, rather
than the other way round. This interpretation is given
in (25):
(25) [every boy] is a function mapping a predicate
P to a truth value, namely it maps P to True if
P is true of every boy.
Note that this analysis still accounts for the exactly
one-argument requirement, which was observed
above, because the result of combining the subject
quantiﬁer and the VP is a truth value, and therefore
cannot be combined with another subject quantiﬁer.
The FregeAjdukiewicz account of (23) does,
however, depart from the intuition that the verb is
predicated of the subject. Note that the semantic
diﬀerencebetweenquantiﬁersandnonquantiﬁcational
NPs does not aﬀect the syntax of English verb–subject
relationships. Still in (1) the verb agrees with the
subject, and the subject must precede the verb.
3.2 Object Quantiﬁers
Considernow(26)withaquantiﬁcationalnounphrase
intheobject position.WearguedinSect.2.1.1 thatthe
interpretation of a transitive verb is given by a higher
orderfunctionthattakesanindividualasanargument
and results in a function that must take another
individual as its argument before resulting in a truth
value. But then (26) is not interpretable if we assume
the FregeAjdukiewicz semantics of quantiﬁers.
(26) John greeted every boy.
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follows that ‘greet’ and ‘every boy’ should be com-
bined semantically to yield a predicate representing
the meaning of the VP. However, the meaning of
‘every boy’ is a higher order predicate that takes a
predicate from individuals to truth values as its
argument.Butthemeaningof‘greet’isnotsucha one-
place predicate.
Any solution to the interpretability problem we
know of posits some kind of readjustment process.
One successful solution is to assume that before the
structure of (26) is interpreted, the object quantiﬁer is
moved out of the verbal argument position (see, e.g.,
Heim and Kratzer 1998). For example the structure
shown in (27) is interpretable.
(27) John λx [every boy] λy [x greeted y]
The movement process deriving (27) from (26) is
called ‘quantiﬁer movement.’ Quantiﬁer movement in
Englishisnotreﬂectedbytheorderinwhichwordsare
pronounced,butthishasbeenclaimedtobethecasein
Hungarian (Kiss 1991).
3.3 Inerse Scope
The original motivation for quantiﬁer movement was
actually not the uninterpretability of quantiﬁers in
object position, but the observation that the scope
relations among quantiﬁers are not ﬁxed in all cases.
In example (17a) in Sect. 2.2.1, the scopal relation
among the quantiﬁcational noun phrases was ﬁxed.
But consider the following sentence:
(28) A boy held every block.
The example is judged true in the situation in picture
A, though there is no single boy such that every block
was held by him.
Picture A Picture B
(29)
The truth of (28) in this situation is not predicted by
the representation in (30) that in some way maintains
the syntactic constituency of the verb and the object to
the exclusion of the subject.
(30) [a boy] λx [every block] λy [x held y]
For this reason, May (1977) and Chomsky (1975)
proposetoallowalsoquantiﬁermovementthatcreates
a constituent which includes the subject and the verb
but not the object (similar ideas go back to Montague
(1970) and Lewis (1972)). This structure is shown
in (31).
(31) [every block] λy [a boy] λx [x held y]
Hence, the hypothesis that movement of quantiﬁ-
cational noun phrases prior to interpretation is poss-
ible (and indeed obligatory in some cases) provides a
solution not only for the problem with interpreting
object quantiﬁers, but also for the availability of
inverse scope in some examples.
4. Concluding Remarks
Many of the questions reviewed above are still topics
of current research. We have based our discussion on
the view that syntax and semantics are autonomous,
and that there is a mapping from syntactic structures
tointerpretation.However,recentworkbyFox(2000)
argues that in some cases properties of interpretation
must be visible to the syntax of quantiﬁer movement.
As the basic inventory of interpretation principles, we
have assumed functional application, predicate modi-
ﬁcation, and lambda abstraction over variables. Other
approaches, however, make use of function com-
position and more complex mathematical processes to
eliminate lambda abstraction (Jacobson and others).
In a separate debate, Sauerland (1998) challenges the
assumptionthatmovementinrelativeclausesshouldbe
interpreted as involving binding of a plain variable in
thebasepositionofmovement.Whilethepropertiesof
scope and binding reviewed in Sect. 2.2 are to our
knowledge uncontroversial, current work extends
this analysis to similar phenomena such as modal
verbs, tense morphemes, comparatives and many
other topics (Stechow and Wunderlich (1991) give a
comprehensive survey).
Research activity on the syntax–semantics interface
is currently expanding greatly, as an increasing num-
ber of researchers become proﬁcient in the basic
assumptions and the formal models of the ﬁelds of
both syntax and semantics. Almost every new issue of
journals such as Linguistic Inquiry or Natural Lan-
guageSemanticsbringswithitsomenewinsightonthe
questions raised here.
See also: Linguistics: Incorporation; Movement
Theory and Constraints in Syntax; Semantics; Syntax;
Valency and Argument Structure in Syntax
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System: Social
A system is a set of diﬀerentiated and interdependent
components. With such an abstract deﬁnition, the
notionofsystemexplicitlyorimplicitlyunderliesall or
mostofthetheoriesofthesocialsciences.Itistherefore
useful to distinguish three ways of conceptualizing
social systems, each one corresponding to a major
paradigm. First, the historicist paradigm, according to
which society constitutes a global system subject to a
necessary law of historical evolution; this paradigm
was mainly represented by Comte and Marx in the
nineteenth century. Second, the structural-functional
paradigm, according to which a society is a system
whose components are the social institutions (the
family, religion, etc.); this approach was developed in
anthropology by Radcliﬀe-Brown and Malinowski in
the1930s,andthenimportedintosociologybyMerton
and Parsons. Third, the actionist paradigm, in which
the social systems are constituted by actors and their
interactions; one of the main sources of this paradigm
is the subjectivist and marginalist revolution that
happened in the 1870s in economics.
1. The Historicist Conception of Social Systems
According to the historicist conception, society is
destined to go through a necessary succession of great
historical stages, each of which is a social system. The
aim of sociology, then, is to determine the nature of
these systems, and especially the historical ‘law’
governing their succession. Thanks to this historical
‘law,’ it becomes possible to know the nature of the
social system that will appear in the future, the nature
of the next great historical stage. What is the use of
knowinginadvanceaninescapablefuture?Comteand
Marx have the same answer: it gives us the power to
facilitate and accelerate the advent of the ideal future
society, since according to them the future social
system will be the ultimate stage in the progress of
humanity.
1.1 Comte and Marx
In his positiist theory, Comte (1824) analyzes the past
and future evolution of society as the succession of
three great social systems. The theological system,
ﬁrst, was represented by the European absolute
monarchies: social phenomena were then interpreted
in the frame of the Christian religion, the spiritual
power was held by the priests and the temporal power
by the aristocracy (the sword). Then came the meta-
physical system ushered in by the French Revolution:
social phenomena were interpreted in the frame of the
philosophy of the Enlightenment, the spiritual power
gave way to freedom of conscience, and the temporal
power came into the hands of the people (democracy).
According to Comte, this metaphysical system is only
transitional. It has a destructive nature and is thus
unable to constitute a lasting social order. It will be
replaced in the future by the positie system, in which
sociology will become a ‘positive’ science (founded,
just like modern physics and chemistry, upon ob-
servation and invariable natural laws), and in which
thespiritualpowerwillbeheldbythescientistsandthe
temporalpower by theproducers(the manufacturers).
Each social system is thus deﬁned by its ‘civilization’
(the state of our understanding of social phenomena)
and by its ‘social organization’ (as deﬁned by who
holds the spiritual and of the temporal powers). Social
organization is here supposed to be determined by the
state of civilization, and the latter is determined by
scientiﬁc progress. Comte believed that this progress
obeyed the law of the three stages: he thought that
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